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Abstract
We describe a generic algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in groups of known order
in which a smoothness concept is available. The running time of the algorithm can be proved
without using any heuristics and leads to a subexponential complexity in particular for nite
elds and class groups of number and function elds which were proposed for use in cryptogra-
phy. In class groups, our algorithm is substantially faster than previously suggested ones. The
subexponential complexity is obtained for cyclic groups in which a certain smoothness assump-
tion is satised. We also show how to modify the algorithm for cyclic subgroups of arbitrary
groups when the smoothness assumption can only be veried for the full group.
Keywords: discrete logarithm, index calculus, class groups, subexponentiality.
Resume
Nous decrivons un algorithme generique pour calculer des logarithmes discrets dans les groupes
d'ordre connu pour lesquels une certaine notion de friabilite est disponible. Le temps de calcul
de l'algorithme peut e^tre prouve sans utiliser d'heuristiques et donne une complexite sous-
exponentielle pour les corps nis et les groupes de classes de corps de nombres et de corps
de fonctions, qui ont ete proposes en cryptographie. Pour les groupes de classes, notre al-
gorithme est substantiellement plus rapide que ceux precedemment suggeres. La complexite
sous-exponentielle est obtenue pour les groupes cycliques dans laquelle une certaine hypothese
sur la friabilite est satisfaite. Nous montrons aussi comment modier l'algorithme pour des
sous-groupes cycliques quand l'hypothese de friabilite ne peut e^tre montree que pour le groupe
entier.
Mots cles: logarithme discret, calcul d'index, groupes de classes, sous-exponentialite.
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1 Introduction
Every nite abelian group is isomorphic to a direct sum of cyclic groups Z=e
i
Z, where the e
i
are
unique provided that e
i+1
divides e
i
. Given such a group a natural task is to make this isomorphism
explicit, hence two fundamental computational problems arise. The rst one is to determine the
order of the group and its structure (i.e. the e
i
), and the second one is to compute discrete
logarithms in it. When those two tasks are feasible, most of the questions concerning the group
can be transferred to the simpler representation.
In this paper we assume that the group order is known and we concentrate on the discrete logarithm
computation: Given an additively written abelian group G, an element g
1
2 G and another element
g
2
2 hg
1
i, the problem consists of nding an integer l such that g
2
= lg
1
. Obviously, the diculty of
the problem depends on the representation of the group. In (Z=NZ;+), for instance, the problem
reduces to taking an inverse modulo N and can be solved in polynomial time by the Euclidean
algorithm. In general the problem is hard and, following Die and Hellman's and ElGamal's
constructions [DH76, ElG85], it is possible to base a cryptosystem on it.
The rst examples of such groups were the multiplicative groups of nite elds; it turned out that in
this case the discrete logarithm problem can be solved in expected subexponential time by so-called
\index calculus algorithms" (see [Odl99] and the references therein), so that the key size in a secure
system based on such a group must be relatively large.
Other important examples are class groups of number elds [McC89, BW88] and Jacobians, i.e.
divisor class groups, of elliptic [Mil86, Kob87] and hyperelliptic curves [Kob89] over nite elds.
Extending the \index calculus" method for nite elds, algorithms with conjectured or rigorously
proven subexponential running time for the discrete logarithm problem in class groups of number
elds [Buc90, Dul91] and high-genus hyperelliptic Jacobians [ADH94, Eng99] and related structures
[MST99] were devised. However, the constants of the running time bounds for these algorithms
are substantially weaker than for the nite eld case. This is due to the fact that the index
calculus algorithms for class groups proceed by solving both computational tasks mentioned in the
rst paragraph: In a rst step, the structure of the group under consideration is determined as
a product of cyclic groups, in a second step, the actual discrete logarithm is computed. For the
multiplicative groups of nite elds, which are cyclic and of known order, the rst phase can be
omitted.
In the present article we close the gap between the running times of discrete logarithm algorithms
for nite elds and class groups. We provide a general framework for solving the discrete logarithm
problem in nite abelian groups which possess an analogue to the unique prime decomposition of
integers. Our basic additional assumption is that the group be cyclic and of known order, which
closely follows the special case of nite elds. If a certain smoothness assumption is satised, our
algorithm has a provable subexponential expected running time. Examining how the well-studied
discrete logarithm problem in nite elds ts into our framework, we recover the same running
time as for the fastest rigorously analysed algorithms known so far. We obtain corresponding
running time results for class groups, which constitute a major improvement compared to the
above mentioned algorithms.
The main result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 1 There exists a probabilistic algorithm that solves a discrete logarithm problem in the
Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve of genus g over the nite eld F
q
when the group is cyclic of known
2
order and g= log q tends to innity. It takes expected time
L
q
g
(
p
2 + o(1)):
Assuming the extended Riemann hypothesis, there exists a probabilistic algorithm that solves a
discrete logarithm problem in the class group of an imaginary quadratic eld of discriminant  D
when the group is cyclic of known order N . It takes expected time
L
N
(
p
2 + o(1)) = L
D
(1 + o(1)):
(Here L
x
(c) stands for exp(c
p
log x
p
log log x).)
Note that we are interested in algorithms with a provable running time only (possibly under the
Riemann hypothesis in the number eld case), whence we do not take into account algorithms of
the number eld sieve type. Such algorithms are conjectured to be asymptotically faster than ours
(and there are both plausible theoretical considerations and numerical evidence to support this
conjecture). In any case, they are only available for nite elds and not for class groups.
The assumption that the group is cyclic and of known order is no restriction from a cryptographic
point of view, as knowledge of the group order is required for digital signatures and to prove
resistance against the Pohlig{Hellman attack. However, the discrete logarithm problem often has
to be solved in a cyclic subgroup, whereas the smoothness assumption can only be veried for the
full group, which itself may not be cyclic. We show that a variant of the algorithm applies to
cryptographically suitable subgroups. Moreover, the modications allow to detect the case that no
discrete logarithm exists, in which the original algorithm would run forever.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the general setting in which the algorithm
described in Section 3 can be used to compute discrete logarithms. The subsequent sections are
devoted to the analysis of the algorithm. We extend some results on sparse linear algebra to
evaluate the probability that the algorithm succeeds and verify its subexponential running time.
Along the way, the general considerations are specialised to classical examples. Finally, in Section 7
we explain how to adapt the algorithm for the cases where the group is not cyclic.
2 Notations and prerequisites
Throughout the paper, we denote by Z the set of integers, by N the set of positive integers, by
log the natural and by log
2
the dual logarithm. Let G be an additively written cyclic group of
known order N , and let Z
N
denote Z=NZ. In general, one would expect that the elements of G
are represented by O(logN) bits and measure algorithmic complexities as functions of N . It is,
however, possible to construct groups whose elements are naturally represented by bit strings of
length in O(logN
0
) for some value N
0
considerably larger than N . For instance, Jacobian groups
of curves of genus g over F
2
are given by (logN
0
) bits for N
0
= 2
g
, whereas the only known lower
bound on N in this case is the Hasse{Weil bound (
p
2   1)
g
 1. While this situation results in
a waste of bandwidth for cryptographic applications and is thus unlikely to occur, for preserving
as much generality as possible we henceforth denote by logN
0
the input size of the problem and
measure all complexities by functions in logN
0
. It turns out that factors polynomial in logN
0
do
not aect the subexponential running time. Hence to simplify the analysis we follow [GG99] and
for some positive function f of N
0
denote by O

(f) the class of functions which are in O(f) up to
a factor bounded by some power of logN
0
.
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To apply the index calculus idea, G must behave similarly to the natural integers or the polynomials
over a nite eld in that each element of G admits a unique decomposition into a \sum of primes".
To model this behaviour, assume that there is a free abelian monoid M over a countable set P, whose
elements are called primes, together with an equivalence relation  on M which is compatible with
its composition law, such that G ' M = . Thus, each element of M has a unique decomposition
into a sum of primes. Let each element of G be represented by a unique element of M of bit size in
O

(1), then G inherits the unique decomposition property. We assume that the arithmetic in G
(addition, negation and test for equality) is performed by manipulating these unique representatives
in time polynomial in logN
0
. Furthermore, we assume that there is a homomorphism of monoids
deg : M ! R
+
, which to each element of M (and thus of G) associates its \size". As M is free over
P, any such homomorphism is given by assigning a non-negative size to each prime and extending
additively. Usually the \size" deg(m) and the bit size of m are closely related in the sense that the
latter is in (deg(m)).
The setting above was introduced by Knopfmacher in [Kno75], who calls M an additive arithmetical
semigroup and G an arithmetical formation. In addition we require that deg(p)  1 for p 2 P and
deg(g) 2 O

(1) for any g 2 G. This ensures that the number of primes in the decomposition of a
group element, counting multiplicities, is bounded above by O

(1).
For a smoothness bound S 2 N denote by P
S
the set of primes of size at most S, by n
S
the
cardinality of P
S
and by n
0
S
the number of elements of M of size at most S. From an algorithmic
point of view, we demand that n
0
S
be nite, that the elements of size at most S can be enumerated
in time polynomial in S and linear in n
0
S
and that an element m 2 M can be tested for being prime
in time polynomial in deg(m) and linear in n
0
deg(m)
(by trial division by all elements of size smaller
than degm, for instance). Thus, P
S
can be constructed in time polynomial in S and quadratic in
n
0
S
. In practice, Eratosthenes's sieve could be used to lower the complexity in n
0
S
; however, the
algorithms studied below are at least quadratic in n
0
S
.
An element of G is called S{smooth if its decomposition involves only primes of P
S
. As the size
of the elements of G is in O

(1), a distinction into smooth and non-smooth elements arises only
for S 2 O

(1). For technical reasons we assume furthermore that log n
S
2 O

(1). We require
that elements of G can be tested for S{smoothness and, if possible, be decomposed into a sum
of primes from P
S
in O

(n
S
), which usually amounts to trial division by the elements of P
S
. In
all cases considered below, the smoothness test and the decomposition are even in O

(
p
n
0
S
) or
O

(1), which results in better running times.
The most ecient smoothness test available for integers to date, which is subexponential in logn
0
S
,
is non-deterministic and not completely reliable in that it may not recognise a smooth element.
Thus, we extend our model as follows: The smoothness test rejects all non-smooth elements; it
recognises a smooth element up to a certain error probability, which may depend on the element
tested, but does not exceed 1=2.
It should be noted that we could work with a more general denition of smoothness, which does
not involve the notion of the size of an element. Also, unique decomposability could be dened in
an abstract way, not involving the notion of a free abelian monoid. However, the more intuitive
denitions apply to all groups considered in the literature so far.
Examples.
1. Finite prime elds G = F

p
Then G can be represented as (N; )= , where m
1
 m
2
if and only if pjm
1
 m
2
, and P is
4
the set of natural prime numbers. The size of an element is given by its logarithm to the base
2, deg(m) = log
2
m, and N
0
= N = p  1.
2. Finite elds of characteristic 2, G = F

2
k
Then G can be represented as (F
2
[X]nf0g; )= , where f
1
 f
2
if and only if f jf
1
 f
2
for some
xed irreducible polynomial f of degree k in F
2
[X], and P is the set of irreducible polynomials
over F
2
. The size of an element is given by its usual degree, and N
0
= N = 2
k
  1.
3. Finite elds of the form G = F

p
k
, p prime
Then G can be represented by the polynomials of degree less than k over F
p
. Denote by F
p
[X]
0
the set of monic polynomials over F
p
. Noticing that any polynomial is the unique product of
its leading coecient and a monic polynomial, G can be represented as (N; ) (F
p
[X]
0
; )= ,
where (m
1
; f
1
)  (m
2
; f
2
) if and only if pjm
1
 m
2
and f jf
1
  f
2
for some xed irreducible
polynomial f of degree k over F
p
. The set of primes P is given by the union of the set of natural
primes and the set of monic irreducible polynomials over F
p
, each embedded into the cartesian
product. The size of an element is deg(m
1
; f
1
) = log
2
m
1
+ deg f
1
, and N
0
= N = p
k
  1.
Notice that these denitions are compatible with Examples 1. and 2.
4. Class groups of number elds
Let K be a number eld and O its ring of integers. Then the class group G of K is dened as
M = , where M is the set of ideals of O (a free abelian monoid over the set P of prime ideals),
and  is induced by the submonoid of principal ideals. The size of an ideal is given by the
logarithm of its norm. If K has unit rank 0, then each ideal class contains a unique so-called
reduced ideal, which can be computed in polynomial time from any representative of the class
as long as (K : Q) is xed. This reduced ideal then constitutes the canonic representative for
the class.
In particular, the case of imaginary quadratic elds Q(
p
D) of discriminant D < 0 is covered.
Let ! =
D+
p
D
2
with minimal polynomial X
2
  DX +
D
2
 D
4
be an element generating an
integral power basis. Then P
S
can be constructed by enumerating all rational primes p  2
S
and solving the equation y
2
p
  Dy
p
+
D
2
 D
4
 0 (mod p), which can be done in expected
polynomial time by a probabilistic algorithm. If this equation does not have a solution, then
p is inert and pO is a principal prime ideal, whence it may be omitted from the factor base.
If the equation has the double solution y
p
= 0, then p is ramied and (p; !) is the only prime
ideal above p in O. Finally, if the equation has two solutions y
p
and y
p
, then p is splitting
and p = (p; !   y
p
) and p = (p; !   y
p
) are the two prime ideals above p in O.
A reduced ideal a = (a; !   b) with ajb
2
  Db +
D
2
 D
4
is S{smooth if and only if all prime
divisors of a are bounded above by 2
S
. Let p be a prime divisor of a and  the exponent
of p in a. Then, as the ideal is reduced, it can be shown that p is not inert, so there is an
ideal of the form p = (p; !   y
p
) above p in O. If y
p
 b (mod p), then the ideal occurs
with multiplicity  in the decomposition of a, otherwise, p occurs with multiplicity . Thus,
the smoothness test and the decomposition of class group elements into primes is completely
reduced to the same problems over the rational integers. Again, we let N
0
= N .
5. Jacobians of curves over nite elds
Let C 2 F
q
[X;Y ] be a plane irreducible projective curve, and G its Jacobian. Fix a divisor
O of degree 1, and let P denote the set of all P   (degP )O with a prime divisor P . The size
of such an element of P is given by degP . Then G ' M = , where M is the free monoid over
P and  is induced by the submonoid of principal divisors. If the prime at innity of F
q
[X]
5
is totally ramied in the function eld of the curve, we may choose O as the prime divisor
at innity, and the Jacobian is isomorphic to the ideal class group of the integral closure of
F
q
[X;Y ] in the function eld. Of particular interest is the case of hyperelliptic curves, which
constitute the function eld analogue of quadratic number elds. A hyperelliptic curve of
genus g over F
q
is the smooth projective model of a plane curve of the form
H = Y
2
+ hY   f
with h 2 F
q
[X] of degree at most g and f 2 F
q
[X] monic of degree 2g + 1 or 2g + 2.
If deg f = 2g + 1, the prime at innity is ramied and the representation of the hyperelliptic
curve by H is called imaginary. The use of such curves in cryptography has been suggested
by Koblitz in [Kob89]. Each divisor class of a hyperelliptic Jacobian in imaginary represen-
tation contains a unique reduced divisor div(a; b) which corresponds to the ideal (a; Y   b)
of F
q
[X;Y ]=(H) and satises a, b 2 F
q
[X], deg b < deg a  g and ajb
2
+ bh   f . Its size
is deg a. So the input size of the problem is O(logN
0
) for N
0
= q
g
. The assumption that
N 2 O

(N
0
) holds since N  (2g + 1)q
g
. For q a prime, this bound is due to Artin ([Art24],
x24, Formula (8)), whose arguments are easily extended to the general case replacing the
Artin character by the general quadratic character. Given a divisor div(a
0
; b
0
), the canonical
reduced representative in its class can be computed in time polynomial in N
0
. The set P
S
can be constructed by enumerating all irreducible polynomials p 2 F
q
[X] of degree at most
S and solving the equation y
2
p
+ hy
p
  f  0 (mod p) in expected polynomial time by a
probabilistic algorithm. All further steps are completely analogous to the case of imaginary
quadratic number elds. The only dierence is that testing for smoothness and decomposing
a group element into primes is reduced to the corresponding problems over the univariate
polynomials instead of the rational integers.
For deg f = 2g + 2, the prime at innity is splitting and H is called a real representation
of the curve. Its Jacobian is no longer isomorphic to the ideal class group of F
q
[X;Y ]=(H).
Instead of working in the Jacobian, it has been suggested to base cryptosystems on discrete
logarithms in the so called infrastructure of the curve [SSW96, MVZ98]. It has been observed
in [PR99] that at least in odd characteristic a constant eld extension of degree at most 2g+2
allows to transform a real into an equivalent imaginary representation. Thus we restrict our
presentation to imaginary curves.
3 Algorithm
We describe the algorithm for a cyclic group whose order is known and not necessarily prime.
Unlike in the Pohlig{Hellman method we do not split the discrete logarithm problem into a series
of problems in subgroups of prime order. In fact, we need to work in the full group to guarantee
a provable proportion of smooth elements, and the generalisation of the algorithm to subgroups
poses challenges which are discussed in Section 7. However, we factor the group order to facilitate
the linear algebra step.
The algorithm takes as input a generator g
1
of a cyclic group G of order N and another element
g
2
2 G. It outputs log
g
1
g
2
, i.e. an integer l 2 f0; : : : ; N   1g such that g
2
= lg
1
.
1) Choose a smoothness bound S and construct the factor base P
S
= fp
1
; : : : ; p
n
g with n = n
S
.
Set k = dlog
2
n+ log
2
log
2
Ne+ 1.
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2) Construct a matrix A = (a
ij
) 2 Z
n(2kn)
N
as follows: For j = 1; : : : ; kn, select randomly and
uniformly 
j
, 
j
2 Z
N
until 
j
g
1
+ 
j
g
2
is S{smooth, and write

j
g
1
+ 
j
g
2
=
n
X
i=1
a
ij
p
i
: (1)
For j = kn + 1; : : : ; 2kn, write j = (k + l)n +m with 0  l  k   1, 1  m  n, and select
randomly and uniformly 
j
, 
j
2 Z
N
until 
j
g
1
+ 
j
g
2
  p
m
is S{smooth; then write

j
g
1
+ 
j
g
2
= p
m
+
n
X
i=1
b
ij
p
i
=
n
X
i=1
a
ij
p
i
: (2)
(In practice, one would only create a few more than n columns of the rst type, see [Gau99].
The second type of columns and the constant k are merely needed to make a rigorous proof
of the running time possible.)
3) By the randomised procedure described in Section 4, try to nd a non-zero vector  =
(
1
; : : : ; 
2kn
) 2 Ker(A). (During this step N is factored.) If the procedure fails, return to 2).
4) If
P
2kn
j=1

j

j
is invertible in Z
N
, then output 

P
2kn
j=1

j

j

 1

P
2kn
j=1

j

j

; otherwise return
to 2).
If the algorithm halts in Step 4), then it outputs the correct discrete logarithm of g
2
to the base
g
1
. The fact that  2 Ker(A) means that
0 =
2kn
X
j=1
a
ij

j
8i = 1; : : : ; n;
multiplying these equations by p
i
and summing them up yields
0 =
2kn
X
j=1
 
n
X
i=1
a
ij
p
i
!

j
=
0
@
2kn
X
j=1

j

j
1
A
g
1
+
0
@
2kn
X
j=1

j

j
1
A
g
2
:
As g
1
and g
2
are both of N{torsion, multiplying by the inverse of
P
2kn
j=1

j

j
in Z
N
, if it exists,
shows the correctness of the result.
4 Linear algebra
As rankA  n, it is possible to nd a non-zero vector  2 Ker(A). How this is done, however,
needs further explication. On one hand, it is desirable to exploit the sparse structure of the matrix,
which has only O

(1) entries per column, and the corresponding algorithms are prone to failure
with a certain probability. On the other hand, a complication is introduced by the fact that N
need not be prime, so that Z
N
may not be a eld.
To exploit the matrix sparseness, one may use a randomised Lanczos algorithm; we rely on the
following trivial corollary of Theorem 6.2 in [EK97].
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Theorem 2 Let F
q
be the nite eld with q elements and let A 2 F
nd
q
be a matrix of rank r with
! non-zero entries and b 2 F
n
q
. There is a probabilistic algorithm which either returns a vector
x 2 F
d
q
such that Ax = b or reports failure. The algorithm requires O(r(! + d)) operations in F
q
and has a failure probability of at most
11d
2
 d
2(q 1)
.
Moreover, the solution vector returned by the algorithm can be made to vary uniformly over all
possible solutions by randomising the right hand side in the following way (in fact, this randomisa-
tion is already part of the algorithm in [EK97]): Choose y 2 F
d
q
according to a uniform distribution,
solve Ax = b + Ay and let x = x   y. If y varied over a xed class of F
d
q
=KerA, then x would
not depend on y, and x would be distributed uniformly over the solution space x + KerA of the
equation. Hence, the same assertion holds when y does not belong to a xed class.
When q is small compared to d, it is not possible to apply the theorem directly. Instead, one
may switch to a eld extension. While this idea does not seem to be new | it was used, for
instance, in the implementation of [LO90], see also [KS91] | we did not nd it detailed in the
literature and thus expand on the topic. In particular, it is possible to maintain the uniform
distribution over the solution vectors. In the situation of Theorem 2, let p be the characteristic
of F
q
,  = minfl : q
l
> 11d
2
; p - lg and q
0
= q

. Then q
 2
 11d
2
, so that q
0
2 O(d
2
q
2
). We
would like to solve a matrix equation over F
q
0
and project the solution onto a solution x 2 F
d
q
of
Ax = b. For projection, one may use the trace function Tr : F
q
0
! F
q
, which is a homomorphism
of F
q
-vector spaces and acts on F
q
as multiplication by . Let b
0
= 
0
b 2 F
d
q
with 
0
 1 (mod p),
so that b
0
= b. The value 
0
exists because gcd(; p) = 1 and can be computed by the extended
Euclidean algorithm in time O(log  log p), which as well as the multiplication of b by 
0
is negligible
compared to the following linear algebra step. Solve Ax
0
= b
0
by the algorithm in [EK97]. The
success probability for this step is at least 1 
11d
2
 d
2(q
0
 1)

1
2
. Let x = Tr(x
0
). Then from the linearity
of the trace we deduce that Ax = Tr(Ax
0
) = Tr(b
0
) = b
0
= b. Moreover, any solution x 2 F
d
q
of
Ax = b can be obtained in this way, and all of them have the same probability of occurring. Namely,
for a given solution x, the set of solutions to Ax
0
= b
0
over F
d
q
0
which map to x under the trace
function is given by 
0
x+ (KerA\KerTr), whose cardinality (q
0
)
dim(KerA\KerTr)
is independent of
x. Thus, we have shown the following result:
Theorem 3 Let A 2 F
nd
q
be a matrix of rank r with ! non-zero entries and b 2 F
n
q
. There is
a probabilistic algorithm which either returns a vector x 2 F
d
q
such that Ax = b or reports failure.
The running time of the algorithm is in O(r(! + d) log
2
(dq)), and its failure probability is at most
1
2
. Moreover, the resulting vector is uniformly distributed over all possible solutions.
This solves the linear algebra step if N is prime. Otherwise, one factors N , computes  modulo
p

for all p

kN and combines the results by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The computations
modulo p

may be broken up into  iterations modulo p via a lifting procedure: Suppose that a
non-zero solution 
1
2 f0; : : : ; p
e
  1g
2kn
is known to the equation Ax  0 (mod p
e
), for instance
A
1
= p
e
 with  2 Z
2kn
. Assume that there is a solution 
2
of Ax   (mod p). Then p
e

2
  
1
is a non-zero solution of Ax  0 (mod p
e+1
). If all computations modulo a prime return a random
vector according to a uniform distribution over all possible solutions, then the combined result
varies uniformly over the kernel of A.
Considering the elementary divisor form of the matrix A, however, it is easily seen that the lifting
procedure may fail if (and only if) rank
Q
A 6= rank
Z
p
A because then the matrix equation Ax  
8
(mod p) need not have a solution. This is the reason why, following [Pom87], we create the matrix
A in a special way, generating many more than the n + 1 columns one would expect to need in
practice and introducing the canonical basis elements p
m
into the matrix. Indeed, it is proved in
Lemma 4.1 and the subsequent remark of [Pom87] that with high probability the matrix has full
rank over Z
p
. We recall this lemma with our notations.
Lemma 4 Let V be a vector space over a eld F with dimV = n < 1. Let S be a nite set
of vectors in V and b
1
; : : : ; b
n
a basis for V . Let k 2 N. We make 2kn independent choices
of elements from S with an arbitrary probability distribution over S, labelling the chosen vectors
v
1
; : : : ; v
kn
; w
1
; : : : ; w
kn
, and we denote by V
0
the subspace of V spanned by v
1
; : : : ; v
kn
, and the
vectors b
j
+w
(j 1)k+i
for j = 1; : : : ; n and i = 1; : : : ; k. Then with probability at least 1 
n
2
k 1
we
have V = V
0
.
In our case, the vector space V is the space of column vectors of size n with coecients in Z
p
, the
basis is the canonical basis, and the set S is the set of all column vectors representing a smooth
element of G. We see that the vectors generating V
0
correspond precisely to the vectors forming
the matrix A. Hence the probability that the lifting is possible on Z
p
is at least 1  
n
2
k 1
. There
are at most
log
2
N
2
distinct primes p whose squares divide N , thus the probability that the lifting
is possible for all of them is at least 1  
nlog
2
N
2
k

1
2
for our choice of k. In this case, repeating
log
2
(2log
2
N) times the algorithm of Theorem 3, we obtain a solution of one problem modulo a
prime with probability at least 1 
1
2
log
2
(2log
2
N)
= 1 
1
2log
2
N
. As at most log
2
N single problems have
to be solved, we get a solution modulo N with probability at least
1
2
. Altogether, Step 3) is thus
successful with a probability of at least
1
4
, in which case the output vector is uniformly distributed
over the kernel.
5 Success probability and running time
To estimate the success probability of the algorithm during one run of Steps 2) to 4), we assume
that Step 2) has been accomplished successfully, the study of this step being postponed to the
running time analysis below.
As shown above, Step 3) succeeds with probability at least
1
4
. The algorithm may also fail if
P
2kn
j=1

j

j
is not invertible in Z
N
in Step 4). However, this happens with a suciently low proba-
bility. For given j  kn and any 
j
, as g
1
is a generator of G and 
j
is uniformly distributed, the
element 
j
g
1
+
j
g
2
is uniformly distributed over all group elements. The same holds for j > kn and

j
g
1
+
j
g
2
  p
m
. Consequently, the matrix A and the vector  are independent random variables,
so that  and  are also independent. Let p be a prime divisor of N . As  is uniformly distributed
over all vectors of the kernel, the probability that  6 0 (mod p) is at least 1 
1
p
. Then the orthog-
onal space of  mod p in Z
2kn
has dimension 2kn 1, and the conditional probability that  mod p
is not orthogonal to  mod p is at least 1 
1
p
. Hence
P
2kn
j=1

j

j
is invertible in Z
N
with probability
at least
Q
pjN

1 
1
p

2
=

'(N)
N

2
. From (3.41) in [RS62] we have
'(N)
N
2 
(1= log logN).
Thus, the total success probability for one run of Steps 2) to 4) is in



1
(log logN)
2

:
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In accordance with Section 2, denote by n
0
= n
0
S
the number of elements of the monoid M whose
sizes are bounded above by S.
With the assumptions set forth in Section 2, P
S
can be constructed in time O

(n
0
2
).
Denote by N
S
the number of S{smooth elements of G, and let t
s
and t
d
be upper bounds on the
expected time needed for a smoothness test and the decomposition of a smooth group element into
a sum of primes, respectively. The time needed for computing one linear combination of g
1
and
g
2
and testing for smoothness is in O

(t
s
); this has to be repeated an expected
N
N
S
times until
a smooth element is obtained. This smooth element is recognised with a probability of at least
1=2, so that no more than two repetitions of the previous procedure are needed on average until a
column of the matrix can be lled. So the total time used in Step 2) is in
O


n

N
N
S
t
s
+ t
d

 O


n
N
N
S
t
s
+ n
2

as 2kn, t
d
2 O

(n).
Let t
f
be a time bound for factoring N . As explained in Section 4, log
2
(2log
2
N)log
2
N 2 O

(1)
executions of the algorithm behind Theorem 3 are required for Step 3). The number of entries in
each column of A is in O

(1), so that Step 3) needs time in O

(t
f
+ n
2
).
Finally, Step 4) can be performed in O

(n).
As only O((log logN)
2
)  O

(1) repetitions of Steps 2) to 4) are needed on average and n  n
0
,
the total running time of the algorithm is in
O


t
f
+ n
0
2
+ n
0
N
N
S
t
s

: (3)
(In all cases under consideration, n and n
0
dier only by polynomial factors in logN
0
, i.e. O

(n) =
O

(n
0
), so that we do not lose anything when replacing n by n
0
.)
Examples.
1. G = F

p
, p prime
With deterministic algorithms due to Pollard and Strassen [Pol74, Str76] we have t
s
2
O

(
p
n
0
). A more ecient probabilistic method has been proved using hyperelliptic curves.
The test of [LPP93] recognises (and decomposes) a smooth number with probability at least
1=2 in time t
s
2 O

(L
n
0
(2=3; c)), where L is the subexponential function as dened in Sec-
tion 6 and c some positive constant. Thus, the total running time is in
O


t
f
+ n
0
2
+ n
0
L
n
0
(2=3; c)
N
N
S

:
2. G = F

2
k
Now t
s
2 O

(1), as a smoothness test can be performed in deterministic polynomial time by
computing the distinct degree factorisation of the polynomial representing the group element.
Precisely, let f 2 F
2
[X]
0
be the element to be tested, and g =
f
gcd(f;f
0
)
its square-free part.
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Then f is S{smooth if and only if g is. As X
2
i
 X is the product of all irreducible polynomials
of degree dividing i in F
2
[X]
0
, the latter is the case if and only if
g = lcm
n
gcd(g;X
2
i
 X) : i = 1; : : : ; S
o
:
Computing X
2
i
 X mod g by successive squaring and reduction modulo g, this can be tested
in time polynomial in S and deg f 2 O(logN). Thus, the total running time of the algorithm
is in
O


t
f
+ n
0
2
+ n
0
N
N
S

:
3. G = F
p
k
, p prime
An element (m; f) 2 N  F
p
[X]
0
is S{smooth if and only if m and f are S{smooth. The
smoothness of m can be tested in time in O

(L
p
(2=3; c)) as mentioned in Example 1. The
smoothness of f can again be checked by distinct degree factorisation in time O

(1). Thus,
the total running time of the algorithm is in
O


t
f
+ n
0
2
+ n
0
L
p
(2=3; c)
N
N
S

:
4. Class groups of imaginary quadratic number elds
As the smoothness test and the decomposition into primes are reduced to the case of natural
integers, the analysis of Example 1. shows that the running time is in
O


t
f
+ n
0
2
+ n
0
L
n
0
(2=3; c)
N
N
S

:
5. Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves
Now the smoothness test and the decomposition are reduced to the case of monic polynomials,
and the analysis of Example 2. carries over and shows that the running time is in
O


t
f
+ n
0
2
+ n
0
N
N
S

:
6 Subexponentiality
Recall the denition of the subexponential function with respect to the input size logN
0
and
parameters  2 (0; 1) and c > 0:
L
N
0
(; c) = e
c(logN
0
)

(log logN
0
)
1 
:
The smaller , the closer this function is to the polynomial L
N
0
(0; dce) = (logN
0
)
dce
in logN
0
. All
rigorously proven subexponential algorithms for discrete logarithms, and also the algorithm of this
article, have  = 1=2. Thus we simplify the notation by omitting the rst parameter when it is
1=2. We state the simple relations
L
N
0
(c
1
)  L
N
0
(c
2
) = L
N
0
(c
1
+ c
2
)
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and
L
N
0
(c
1
) + L
N
0
(c
2
) 2 (L
N
0
(max(c
1
; c
2
))):
Furthermore, functions in O

(1) or O(L
N
0
(; c)) for  < 1=2 are in L
N
0
(o(1)), where o(1) stands
for the set of real valued functions tending to zero as N
0
!1.
Assume that we have a smoothness result of the following form:
The bound S can be chosen such that
n
0
2 O(L
N
0
(+ o(1)))
and
N
N
S
2 O(L
N
0
( + o(1)))
for some constants ,  > 0.
The assumption N 2 O

(N
0
) implies that L
N
(c) 2 O(L
N
0
(c) + o(1)). Taking into account that N
can be factored in expected time in O(L
N
(1+o(1)))  O(L
N
0
(1+o(1))) by the algorithm presented
in [LP92] and introducing an exponent  such that t
s
2 O

(n
0

), we can specialise (3) to obtain
O (L
N
0
(max(1; 2; (1 + )+ ) + o(1))) :
In fact, the constants for all examples presented below are worse than 1 anyway, so that the need
for factoring N has no inuence on our running time bounds.
Examples.
1. G = F

p
, p prime; N
0
= N = p  1
With the usual notation  (x; y) for the number of integers between 1 and x all prime factors
of which are not larger than y, we have
N
N
S
=
N
 (N;2
S
)
. Let S = dlog(L
N
())e, so that
n
0
= 2
S
2 [L
N
(); 2L
N
()]. Then Lemma 3.1 in [Pom87] shows that
N
N
S
2 O(L
N
( + o(1)))
with  =
1
2
. Moreover from n
0
2 O(L
N
()) we deduce L
n
0
(2=3; c) 2 L
N
(o(1)). The running
time of the algorithm is thus in
O

L
N

max

2; +
1
2
; 1

+ o(1)

for any  > 0; the optimal choice  = 1=
p
2 yields a running time in
O(L
N
(
p
2 + o(1))):
This is precisely the complexity of the fastest known algorithm described in [Pom87].
2. G = F

2
k
; N
0
= N = 2
k
  1
Denote by N
q
(d;m) the number of monic polynomials of degree d over F
q
all prime factors
of which have degree at most m. Then
N
N
S

2
k
N
2
(k 1;S)
. Let S = dlog(L
N
())e, so that
n
0
2 (L
N
()). Theorem 2.1 in [BP98] shows that N
2
(k   1; S) 2
2
k 1
u
(1+o(1))u
for u =
k 1
S

12
1
q
logN
log logN

1

p
logN . Thus, a few computations reveal that
N
N
S
2 O(L
N
( + o(1))) for
 =
1
2
, and the running time of the algorithm is in O

L
N

max

2;  +
1
2
; 1

+ o(1)

for
any  > 0. The optimal choice  = 1=
p
2 again yields a running time in
O(L
N
(
p
2 + o(1)));
which corresponds to the fastest known algorithms described in [Pom87] and [BP98].
3. G = F
p
k
, p prime; N
0
= N = p
k
  1
Notice rst that in the polynomial representation we have chosen, it is impossible to obtain
a subexponential running time for xed k  2 and p ! 1. If we let S = 0, then only the
constants have a chance of being smooth, and
N
N
S

p
k
 1
p 1
 p
k 1
is exponential in N . If
S  1, then all p monic linear polynomials are contained in the factor base, which is thus of
exponential size. Hence, we must restrict our attention to instances in which p is suciently
small compared to k.
Letting S = dlog
p
(L
N
())e, we obtain the estimate
N
N
S

p
 (p  1; 2
S
)

p
k 1
N
p
(k   1; S)
2 O

pL
N

1
2
+ o(1)

as in Example 2, which introduces an unwanted factor of p. Moreover, since we have to round
up S, it need not be true any more that n
0
2 O(L
N
()). In fact,
n
0
=
S
X
i=0


ff 2 F
0
p
[X] : deg f = ig


 jfm 2 f1; : : : ; p  1g : log
2
m  S   igj
=
S
X
i=0
p
i
min

p  1; 2
S i
	

S 1
X
i=0
p
i+1
+ p
S
2 O
 
p
S

 O(pL
N
()):
For a rst special result we consider the case p 2 O(logN) or more generally p 2 O

(1),
which implies n
0
2 O

(L
N
()) and L
p
(2=3; c) 2 L
N
(o(1)). So the running time analysis of
Example 2. carries over without modication.
More generally, we must ensure that p is subexponential in logN = k log p. Following the
ideas in [Eng99], we consider the case k  # log p for some positive constant #, in which
p  L
N

1
p
#

. Then n
0
2 O

L
N

+
1
p
#

and
N
N
S
2 O

L
N

1
2
+
1
p
#
+ o(1)

for the
same value of S as above, L
p
(2=3; c) 2 L
N
(o(1)) and the total running time is in
O

L
N

max

2+
2
p
#
; +
1
2
+
2
p
#
; 1

+ o(1)

:
The optimal choice for  is
p
2
2
, which yields a running time of
O

L
N

p
2 +
2
p
#
+ o(1)

:
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Asymptotically for #!1 (e.g., for p xed), we recover the running time of Example 2.
In [AD93], Adleman and DeMarrais describe an algorithm with conjectured subexponential
running time for p > k. They represent the eld as the ring of integers of a number eld
modulo a prime ideal. See also [Sem95]. It is an interesting open question whether there is a
provably subexponential algorithm for all nite elds using possibly such a representation.
4. Class groups of imaginary quadratic number elds
Let D denote the discriminant of the number eld. It is shown in [Sey87], Proposition 4.4,
that assuming the generalised Riemann hypothesis,
N
N
S
2 O
 
L
jDj
 
1
4c
+ o(1)

for S =
dlogL
jDj
(c)e. Due to a theorem of Siegel's [Sie36], log jDj 2 (2 + o(1)) logN so that L
jDj
(c+
o(1)) = L
N
(
p
2c + o(1)). Letting S = dlogL
N
()e, we deduce n 2 O(L
N
()) and
N
N
S
2
O

L
N

1
2
+ o(1)

. Repeating the analysis of Example 1 shows that our algorithm has a
running time in
O

L
N

p
2 + o(1)

= O
 
L
jDj
(1 + o(1))

under the generalised Riemann hypothesis. This improves the running time of O(L
jDj
(
p
2 +
o(1))) of the algorithm described in [HM89] for determining the class group structure without
any previous information.
5. Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves
Recall that N
0
= q
g
. Letting S = dlog
q
L
q
g
()e, we have n  2qL
q
g
(). Again, we follow
[Eng99] and consider only instances with g  # log q for some positive constant #, so that
q  L
q
g

1
p
#

. It is shown in [ES00] that then N
S
 q
g
L
q
g

 
1
2

, so that
N
N
S
2 O


N
0
N
S


O

L
q
g

1
2
+ o(1)

, and the running time of the algorithm is in
O

L
q
g

max

2+
2
p
#
; +
1
2
+
1
p
#
; 1

+ o(1)

:
A similar analysis as that of Example 3. shows that the optimal choice of  is
minf; 

(#)g = min
(
p
2
2
;
r
1
2
+
1
4#
 
1
2
p
#
)
=
r
1
2
+
1
4#
 
r
1
4#
;
which yields an overall running time of
O
 
L
q
g
 
p
2
 
r
1 +
1
2#
+
r
1
2#
!
+ o(1)
!!
:
This improves considerably on the running time of
O
 
L
q
g
 
5
p
6
 
r
1 +
3
2#
+
r
3
2#
!
+ o(1)
!!
in [Eng99], and asymptotically for # ! 1 (e.g., for q constant), the constant of the subex-
ponential function is again the same as in Example 2.
Hence, our algorithm shows that cryptosystems based on high-genus hyperelliptic Jacobians
are signicantly weaker than expected so far, in particular they oer no security gain when
compared to cryptosystems in nite elds of comparable size.
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7 Cyclic subgroups
Unlike nite elds, many groups of cryptographic interest do not have a cyclic structure. For
instance the number of cyclic factors of hyperelliptic Jacobians can be up to twice as large as the
genus. Hence it is an important task to compute discrete logarithms in a cyclic subgroup H = hg
1
i
of a given abelian group G. From a heuristic point of view, this does not pose any problems:
The algorithm in its formulation of Section 3 remains applicable. With the usual assumption
that smoothness and membership in a subgroup are independent concepts, i.e. the proportion of
smooth elements is the same in H as in G, the running time analysis carries over from the group
to its subgroup. However, we are concerned with provable running times in this article, and the
smoothness results presented so far apply exclusively to the full groups under consideration. In
this section, we discuss a few approaches to deal with this situation.
Perturbing with elements of the complement
The simplest situation arises when gcd

jHj;
jGj
jHj

= 1; then H admits a complement H
0
in G, i.e.,
G = H  H
0
. Assume that it is possible to select independently elements h
j
of H
0
according to
a uniform distribution in time polynomial in logN
0
. This is for instance the case if we can select
random elements in G, because multiplying a uniformly distributed element of G by
jGj
jHj
yields a
uniformly distributed element of H
0
. Another favourable situation is the case where we know a
basis of H
0
. (In this context, we understand by a basis of H
0
a set fb
1
; : : : ; b
r
g such that H
0
is equal
to the direct sum hb
1
i      hb
r
i. The cardinality r of a basis is not an invariant of H
0
, but it is
bounded above by log
2
jH
0
j.)
Then 
j
g
1
+
j
g
2
+h
j
is uniformly and independently of  distributed over G, so that the algorithm
may be carried out with these group elements instead of 
j
g
1
+ 
j
g
2
. If it is successful, then
0
@
2kn
X
j=1

j

j
1
A
g
1
+
0
@
2kn
X
j=1

j

j
1
A
g
2
=  
2kn
X
j=1

j
h
j
2 H \H
0
= f0g;
so that
log
g
1
g
2
=
0
@
2kn
X
j=1

j

j
1
A
 1
0
@
2kn
X
j=1

j

j
1
A
as before. Also, the running time analysis remains unchanged.
While this situation seems to be very special, it is typical for cryptographic applications in which
H is supposed to have large prime order and the cofactor
jGj
jHj
is small, so that jHj and
jGj
jHj
are
automatically coprime. Moreover, for
jGj
jHj
polynomial in logN
0
, the structure and, in particular,
a basis of H
0
' G=H can be determined in polynomial time (see, for instance, [Coh93]), and the
assumptions of this subsection are satised.
Using a basis for G
Assume that a basis fb
1
; : : : ; b
r
g of G along with the orders e
1
; : : : ; e
r
of its elements are known.
Then the discrete logarithm problem can be solved in two steps. Instead of directly writing g
2
as a
15
multiple of g
1
we rst express g
1
as a linear combination of the basis elements and then proceed in
the same way for g
2
. The discrete logarithm can be computed by a few operations modulo the e
i
.
In order to write g
1
in terms of the b
i
, a slight variation of the algorithm allows to use the smoothness
properties. For given j  kn, pick random elements 
ij
and 
j
until
P

ij
b
i
+
j
g
1
is S{smooth and
write this element as
P
a
ij
p
i
. Similarly, for j > kn pick random elements until
P

ij
b
i
+
j
g
1
 p
m
is S{smooth. Here again, the elements of G which are tested for smoothness are distributed
uniformly and independently of , so that the same analysis as in Section 5 can be carried out.
Hence with high probability a non-zero vector of the kernel is obtained and g
1
is expressed as a
linear combination g
1
=
P

i
b
i
. The same process yields g
2
=
P

i
b
i
. Now try to solve the system
of modular equations 
i
 l
i
(mod e
i
). If this is possible, then l is the correct discrete logarithm
of g
2
with respect to g
1
. Otherwise, g
2
does not lie in the cyclic subgroup generated by g
1
. In this
case, which does not occur in the cryptographic setting, the original algorithm of Section 3 would
run forever without giving proof of the non-existence of the discrete logarithm. Thus, the ability
to detect this case is an additional advantage of the modied algorithm.
8 Conclusions
We have presented a generic probabilistic algorithm for computing discrete logarithm in cyclic
groups of known order in which a notion of smoothness is available. Many groups suggested for
cryptosystems t into this context. The running time of the algorithm can be analysed rigorously
without any heuristic assumptions. The analysis leads to a subexponential complexity as soon as
a certain smoothness assumption is veried. In particular, we recover the running time bounds of
the fastest algorithms with proven complexity for nite elds and obtain substantial improvements
over the previously known algorithms for class groups. This theoretical result is backed by a recent
implementation of the algorithm for hyperelliptic Jacobians, which shows that even curves of a
rather small genus are insecure in a cryptographic context [Gau99].
When examining subexponential algorithms, it is common to distinguish between inecient meth-
ods with a provable running time and practical methods with a conjectured running time. Our
algorithm breaks with this tradition. It is the fastest known algorithm for the discrete logarithm
problem in hyperelliptic Jacobians both in theory and in practice. In fact, the implementation of
[Gau99] was the starting point of our study, and while the modications described in this article are
necessary to prove the running time, they do not alter the nature of the algorithm fundamentally.
In general, the groups we are concerned with are not cyclic, but we have shown that suitable
modications allow to apply the algorithm to a wide class of non-cyclic groups, preserving the
subexponential running time. Among these are all groups of cryptographic interest. In particular,
the analysis of the algorithm remains valid when a basis of G is known. It is thus an interesting
question whether a basis can be built if only the group order and its factorisation are known. In
the case that the order is square-free, an obvious probabilistic method constructs a basis. If the
primes which occur with multiplicity are of polynomial size, they can be dealt with by an exhaustive
construction. Considering the remaining case of a power of a large prime, it seems plausible that
the notion of smoothness available in the group should allow to construct a probabilistic algorithm
for determining the basis.
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